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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
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Washington, DC 20529



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services




FILE: [REDACTED]

Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER


Date: JUL 9 2004

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:




PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.


Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

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Administrative Appeals Office
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Department of Homeland Security

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a retail store. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a retail store manager. As required by statute, a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification approved by the Department of Labor, accompanied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and denied the petition accordingly.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor. *See* 8 CFR § 204.5(d). Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing on March 5, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$9.73 per hour, which amounts to \$20,238.40 annually.

With the petition, the petitioner submitted the petitioner's tax returns on Form 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation, for the years 1999 through 2001.

Because the evidence submitted was insufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, on November 15, 2002, the director requested additional evidence pertinent to that ability. The director requested a complete copy of the petitioner's 2000 tax return and a copy of the petitioner's Quarterly Federal Tax Return (Form 941) for all four (4) quarters of the year 2001.

In response, the petitioner submitted the petitioner's tax returns on Form 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation, for the years 2000 and 2001, documentation relating to the petitioner's business such as leasing and licensing, and a Wage and Tax Register generated by Automatic Data Processing, Inc., that does not include any evidence of employment of the beneficiary by the petitioner.

At the outset, only the financial data relating to 2001 is pertinent for analysis since that is the priority date. The tax returns reflect the following information for 2001:

	<u>2001</u>
Ordinary income	\$9,372
Current Assets	\$0
Current Liabilities	\$0
Net current assets	\$0
Gross receipts	\$530,147
Salaries and wages	\$0

The director determined that the evidence submitted did not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, and, on May 16, 2003, denied the petition.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner's gross receipts, total income, and cost of labor reflect its ability to pay the proffered wage.

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner did not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage in 2001.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, CIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Counsel's reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient. In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that CIS had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service, now CIS, should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. In the instant case, the petitioner's net income in the year 2001 was \$9,372, which is too low to cover the proffered wage. Thus, the petitioner cannot demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage through its net income.

Nevertheless, counsel is correct that the petitioner's net income is not the only statistic that can be used to demonstrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not

equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.¹ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage out of those net current assets. The petitioner's net current assets during the year in question, 2001, however, were zero (0). As such, the director's failure to consider the petitioner's net current assets did not prejudice the petitioner's cause since the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage out of its net current assets.

The petitioner has not demonstrated that it paid any wages to the beneficiary during 2001. In 2001, the petitioner shows a net income of only \$9,372 and no net current assets and has not, therefore, demonstrated the ability to pay the proffered wage out of its net income or net current assets.

The petitioner has not demonstrated that any other funds were available to pay the proffered wage. Counsel advised that the petitioner will replace outside contractors with the beneficiary and cites savings to the petitioner of its "cost of labor" on its tax return. The record does not, however, name these outside contractors, state their wages, verify their compensation, or provide evidence that the petitioner replaced or will replace them with the beneficiary. Wages already paid to others are not available to prove the ability to pay the wage proffered to the beneficiary at the priority date of the petition and continuing to the present. Additionally, without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). The petitioner has not, therefore, shown the ability to pay the proffered wage during 2001.

Counsel also cites unpublished AAO decisions for the erroneous premise that depreciation should be added back to net income. There is no precedent that would allow the petitioner to "add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year." See *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, *supra*, 719 F. Supp. at 537. While 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) provides that AAO precedent decisions are binding on all CIS employees in the administration of the Act, unpublished decisions are not similarly binding. Furthermore, the AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, e.g. *Matter of Church Scientology International*, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988).

¹ According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

It would be absurd to suggest that CIS or any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. *Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery*, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), *cert denied*, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988).

The petitioner failed to submit evidence sufficient to demonstrate that it had the ability to pay the proffered wage during 2001. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.